LESTER-MANAK(DO NOT DELETE)

5/16/2020 9:08 AM

A PROPOSAL FOR A COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY AT THE WTO
SIMON LESTER & INU MANAK*
World Trade Organization (WTO) committees meet regularly to
monitor and oversee the implementation of the WTO agreements. It rarely
makes the news, but this work is nonetheless an important supportive
function of the organization. The committees cover a wide range of topics,
and some have been added from time to time. In this Article, we propose a
Committee on National Security to address the growing challenge to the
trade regime presented by national security measures. WTO litigation has a
limited ability to handle these sensitive issues, and there would be great
value in a committee designated to provide oversight of these measures. This
would include the following components: a forum for regular discussion and
coordination of approaches on trade-related aspects of national security
matters; a monitoring mechanism to increase transparency on the use and
application of national security measures; a Technical Group for developing
recommendations and guidelines; and a process for immediate rebalancing,
either through compensation or retaliation, where such measures have been
imposed and their impact on trade can be demonstrated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
World Trade Organization (WTO) litigation is often high-profile and
receives many of the headlines relating to the organization’s work. Legal
rulings that one country may impose billions of dollars in trade sanctions on
another, or that an environmental law has been found to violate international
trade obligations, grab people’s attention. But there is lesser-known
administrative work of the WTO, where various committees1 meet regularly
to monitor and oversee the implementation of the WTO agreements. It rarely
makes the news, but this work is nonetheless an important supportive
function of the organization.
Like other parts of the WTO, the committees are member-driven and
are composed of country delegates from either the missions in Geneva or
from the capitals. While they do not make decisions that have binding legal
effect, they can serve a variety of functions, such as sharing best practices,
developing guidelines for technical cooperation activities, or providing a
forum for Members to discuss trade actions another Member has taken. This
last function covers a range of different measures: tariffs, rules of origin,
anti-dumping measures, environmental protection measures, and other
domestic regulations, such as anti-obesity food labeling rules, to name a few.
It is important to note that not all matters discussed in committees are
covered directly by WTO obligations.
The committees cover a wide range of topics, but these generally fit into
two broad categories: those that focus on specific obligations in the WTO
agreements, such as the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, the
Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Safeguards; and those that
focus on broader systemic issues, such as the Committee on Trade and
Environment, Committee on Trade and Development, and the Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements.
But there is no reason for the current list to be set in stone. Committees
have been added from time to time, such as the Working Group on Trade,
Debt, and Finance and the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of
Technology, which were established pursuant to the Doha Mandate, and
more recently, the Committee on Trade Facilitation.2 If additional areas
would benefit from oversight, new committees should be formed. The
1. The term “committee” is used here to describe the work of councils, specific committees and
working groups.
2. See Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, WTO, https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_wkgp _trade_debt_finance_e.htm; Working Group on Trade and Transfer
of Technology, WTO (June 16, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ devel_e/dev_wkgp_
trade_transfer_technology_e.htm; Trade facilitation, WTO (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm - V.
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political decision-making bodies of the WTO, the Ministerial Council and
the General Council, have the authority to establish new committees, and set
their terms of reference, that is, the scope of what the committee covers. In
this Article, we propose a Committee on National Security to address the
growing challenges to the trade regime3 presented by national security
measures. WTO litigation has a limited ability to handle these sensitive
issues,4 and there would be great value in a committee designated to provide
oversight of these measures. As described in more detail below, this would
include the following components: a forum for regular discussion and
coordination of approaches on trade-related aspects of national security
matters; a monitoring mechanism to increase transparency on the use and
application of national security measures; a Technical Group for developing
recommendations and guidelines; and a process for immediate rebalancing,
either through compensation or retaliation, where such measures have been
imposed and their impact on trade can be demonstrated.
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF WTO COMMITTEES
The WTO is made up of a number of standing and ad hoc bodies with
various roles.5 The Ministerial Conference, which serves as the highest
executive body and is composed of minister-level representatives from each
country, meets at least every two years. The Ministerial Conference can
make binding decisions on all WTO matters. The General Council, which
meets regularly throughout the year, has the same authority as the Ministerial
Conference when the latter is not in session, and is made up of ambassadorlevel diplomats. Representatives to the General Council also sit on the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which meets every month, and the Trade
Policy Review Body (TPRB).

3. See generally J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order,
129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing the impact of national security policies on trade law and
investment flows).
4. The value of WTO litigation on these issues is uncertain at this point. National security
litigation could harm the WTO as an institution if Members do not comply with rulings, as it would
undermine confidence in the system more broadly. On the other hand, there may be instances where a
government wants a national security restriction adjudicated simply for the moral force a ruling provides.
A full evaluation of the impact of this litigation will have to await the outcomes of several ongoing cases.
See generally Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, A Proposal for ‘Rebalancing’ to Deal with ‘National Security’
Trade Restrictions, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1451 (2019) [hereinafter, Lester & Zhu, Proposal for
Rebalancing] (discussing the recent increase in litigation involving WTO concerns); Simon Lester &
Huan Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box: The Growing Abuse of the National Security Rationale for Restricting
Trade, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS (June 25, 2019) [hereinafter Lester & Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box]
(discussing the Trump Administration’s expansion of the WTO’s national security rationale clause).
5. WTO Organizational Chart, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
organigram_e.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
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Below the General Council are numerous administrative bodies,
including specialized councils, committees, working groups, and working
parties that support the work of both the General Council and the Ministerial
Conference. Notably, these bodies operate with high degrees of
independence, as their work tends to be highly technical.6 The committees
and working groups operate below the political or executive arm of the
WTO, with some reporting to the Council for Trade in Goods and the
Council for Trade in Services.
The WTO’s committees are responsible for what is known as the
“regular work” of the organization—they oversee the day-to-day
implementation of the agreements, as well as discuss a number of systemic
issues. Some of this work is focused on developing specific or general
guidelines, recommendations, decisions, and principles that can help
facilitate the implementation of the agreements. It is important to note that
this function does not change the text of the agreements, but rather serves as
the “building blocks” to establish best practices.7 For instance, principles
developed in the TBT Committee have shaped a number of obligations in
regional trade agreements.8 Furthermore, these knowledge exchanges are
vital in preventing trade friction from arising between Members in the first
place through increasing transparency, for example, by establishing clear
guidelines on when a Member should notify a potentially trade impacting
measure, and what that notification should include.
Another important aspect of some committees is the “specific work,”
which provides an opportunity for members to raise what can be referred to
as “specific trade concerns” on measures that other Members have taken or
may be planning to take that could cause trade friction.9 These concerns are
sometimes based on official notifications from Members, actions that may
warrant a notification, or counternotifications from other Members. Specific
trade concerns are raised by one or more Member (the Members concerned)
to another Member (the Member maintaining the measure).
A number of scholars and experts have noted that the specific function
has been especially beneficial in providing a forum to resolve disagreements

6. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 135 (4th ed. 2017).
7. ERIK N. WIJKSTRÖM, INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. [ICTSD], THE THIRD
PILLAR: BEHIND THE SCENES, WTO COMMITTEE WORK DELIVERS 3 (Aug. 2015).
8. Devin McDaniels et al., A Closer Look at WTO’s Third Pillar: How WTO Committees Influence
Regional Trade Agreements, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 815, 830 (2018).
9. WIJKSTRÖM, supra note 7, at 4. Not all committees refer to these as specific trade concerns, but
they exist in many committees under different categories of issues discussed, and can be raised, for
example, as separate agenda items, and in more limited cases as “Other Business.”
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before they can become disputes.10 However, others have pointed out that
the outcome of resolutions is often limited, with regulatory adjustments only
at the margins.11 What many agree on is that the committees provide an
essential forum for Members to openly discuss concerns, particularly giving
voice to smaller country Members that do not always have the resources to
travel between capitals to find clarification or resolution on an issue. In
addition, the committees also provide Members the opportunity to identify
other Members that are similarly impacted by a measure and to coordinate a
response.12
While the committees vary greatly in all of these functions, with the
technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
committees often identified as models of success, all provide similar basic
functions that are vital to the organization’s daily operation. Thus, there is
room to learn from how different committees that address a wide range of
issues, sometimes cross-cutting, are able to manage a balance between the
right of Members to take certain actions and the overall maintenance of an
open multilateral trading system. In the next sections, we examine recent
concerns over the role of national security in the trading system and explore
how a specialized committee might be of value in this area.
III. THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY LITIGATION
After decades of careful avoidance of WTO disputes over national
security measures, there has been a proliferation of such disputes in recent
years.13 But can the WTO litigation process resolve these disputes?

10. See Kateryna Holzer, Addressing Tensions and Avoiding Disputes: Specific Trade Concerns in
the TBT Committee 2–3 (WTO, Econ. Research & Statistics Div. Staff, Working Paper ERSD-2018-11,
2018), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201811_e.pdf; Henrik Horn et al., In the Shadow
of the DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees 1 (Columbia
Univ. Law Sch., The Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 494, 2013) (discussing how STCs can
serve as informal mechanisms for resolution of trade conflict); WIJKSTRÖM, supra note 7, at 4–5
(discussing the effectiveness of STCs). See generally Robert Wolfe, Letting the Sun Shine in at the WTO:
How Transparency Brings the Trading System to Life (WTO, Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD-2013-03,
2013) (discussing the merits of the WTO’s dispute settlement system).
11. Tim Dorlach & Paul Mertenskötter, Interpreters of International Economic Law: Corporations
and Bureaucrats in Contest Over Chile’s Food Warning Label, (forthcoming); Inveer Manak, Enforcing
International Trade Law in the World Trade Organization’s Committees: Courting Third Party Opinion
147 (Nov. 24, 2019) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with Georgetown
University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences).
12. See Manak, supra note 11 (“The committees are not a cold call, and not an exercise in general
learning about a measure—they are primarily targeted at learning about the responses of the broader
membership.”).
13. Recent cases with a national security element are as follows: Eight complaints in United
States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products filed in 2018 (DS544, 547, 548, 550, 551,
552, 554, 556); five complaints involving Qatar as a complainant or a respondent, two filed in 2019
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The first WTO panel report interpreting the GATT Article XXI national
security exception was issued in 2019 in the Russia—Traffic in Transit
case.14 In the coming months and years, there will likely be several additional
rulings in ongoing cases, including the highly contentious litigation over the
Section 232 steel/aluminum tariffs imposed by the United States under the
Trump administration. But the prospects of such rulings providing a
resolution to those cases are limited.15 To some extent, a Member’s
declaration that a measure is for national security purposes could be taken as
a statement that it will not change the measure even in the face of a WTO
DSB ruling against it. As a result, there may be limits to the effectiveness of
litigation in this area.
Of course, DSB rulings and subsequent compliance through
modification or withdrawal of the measure are not the only ways to resolve
trade conflict. Article 3 of the DSU refers to “mutually agreed solutions,”
and a variety of such agreements have been reached over the years. As long
as it does not violate a specific WTO obligation, any such solution is
permitted. One solution that is always available is to rebalance the
obligations as between the parties involved in the conflict, in the form of
compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations as
temporary measures.
In the context of disputes, rebalancing takes place pursuant to the
provisions of DSU Article 22. But there are other possibilities for
rebalancing, such as the special procedures of Article 8 of the Safeguards
Agreement, which allow for compensation and retaliation without going
through a dispute settlement process.16 Making rebalancing available in these
circumstances is a political and policy decision. Traditionally, immediate
rebalancing has only been available for safeguards, but the case could be
made for rebalancing in other contexts too.
There is a strong case for immediate rebalancing in the context of
national security.17 Where national security is mentioned, formally or
informally, as a justification for a measure, a violation is often assumed and
not even contested, although where litigation eventually arises, a responding
(DS567, 576), one filed in 2018 (DS526), two filed in 2017 (DS527, 528); four disputes between Russian
and Ukraine, one filed in 2020 (DS499), one filed in 2019 (DS512), two filed in 2017 (DS525, 532); and
a complaint, filed in 2019, by South Korea against Japan (DS590).
14. Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R
(adopted Apr. 5, 2019).
15. Lester & Zhu, Proposal for Rebalancing, supra note 4, at 1451−52; Lester & Zhu, Closing
Pandora’s Box, supra note 4, at 1.
16. Lester & Zhu, Proposal for Rebalancing, supra note 4, at 1468; Lester & Zhu, Closing
Pandora’s Box, supra note 4, at 7.
17. Lester & Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box, supra note 4, at 1.
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party may put forward arguments contesting that assumption. If the national
security justification is upheld in the context of litigation, there is little hope
of inducing compliance with WTO obligations. As noted, a government’s
declaration of national security as the reason for a measure is essentially a
statement that it will not comply with a ruling against it. Thus, moving on to
the rebalancing stage immediately where national security has been formally
cited as the justification for the measure is appropriate.
For rebalancing to work, however, there needs to be a set of rules that
define the scope of measures covered18 and a body to oversee them. A
Committee on National Security can be helpful here, and can also serve
additional functions related to conflict over trade restrictions related to
national security.
IV. THE ROLE OF A COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
In response to the Trump administration’s Section 232 steel/aluminum
tariffs, which were imposed in 2018, many countries latched on to the
Safeguards Agreement rebalancing process as a way to retaliate. That
approach was of questionable legality,19 given that the United States had not
purported to be taking safeguard measures, but as a matter of principle it was
understandable. What is missing is a legal and orderly process for achieving
a similar outcome, with an option of compensation rather than retaliation as
the means of rebalancing. A Committee on National Security could take on
this role and guide the issue of national security trade restrictions more
generally.
The General Council can establish a Committee on National Security
(NS) and set out its terms of reference. Given the cross-cutting nature of
national security issues (affecting goods, services, intellectual property, and
various systemic issues), the NS Committee should report directly to the
General Council. The precise scope of the committee would have to be
18. If all measures justified by national security were subject to rebalancing, the system would be
overwhelmed, so it is only a subset of national security measures that are covered. One approach would
be to apply this process to new measures that upset the existing negotiated balance, but other possibilities
could also be explored.
19. The United States challenged the retaliatory actions of six Members. See Request for
Consultations, Canada—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc.
WT/DS557/1 (Sept. 11, 2019); Request for Consultations, China—Additional Duties on Certain Products
from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS558/1 (Sept. 11, 2019); Request for Consultations, European
Union—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS559/1 (Sept.
11, 2019); Request for Consultations by the United States, Mexico—Additional Duties on Certain
Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS560/1 (Jul. 19, 2018); Request for Consultations,
Turkey—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS561/1 (Sept.
11, 2019); Request for Consultations, Russian Federation—Additional Duties on Certain Products from
the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS566/1 (Sept. 11, 2019).
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defined through discussions at the level of the Ministerial Conference or the
General Council. In general terms, it should serve as a focal point for the
discussion and coordination of approaches to national security matters and
trade in the WTO, as well as be open to the participation of any Member.
Bringing these discussions to a permanent committee at an early stage, with
a clear process for addressing them, could be useful in reducing the
sometimes adversarial nature of exchange on these issues in the General
Council when they occasionally burst onto the agenda.20
In developing the scope of the NS committee’s work, the following
should be considered for the terms of reference:
• To have the Committee elect its own Chair and meet as necessary, but
no less than once a year, for the purpose of affording Members the
opportunity of consulting on any matters relating to trade and
national security.
• To keep measures taken for national security reasons that have an
impact on trade under continuous review. This can include, but is
not limited to, notifications, counternotifications, and annual
reviews of the committee’s work, reported to the General Council.
Formal invocation of GATT Article XXI, GATS Article XIV, or
TRIPS Agreement Article 73 is not required for a measure to be
considered.
• To provide guidelines and recommendations for, and to review
periodically, technical cooperation activities as they relate to
national security measures. This can include, for example, guidance
on notification requirements and how sensitive information should
be handled.
• To establish an open-ended Technical Group and working parties or
other bodies as may be appropriate, including ad hoc consultation
bodies, to allow for off-the-record discussions on specific matters
between interested parties.
• To provide guidance on the rebalancing process, including, for
example, general principles and guidelines for ad hoc consultations.
20. For example, China put the United States’ Section 232 Investigations and Measures on Steel
and Aluminum Products on the General Council agenda on May 8, 2018. See WTO General Council,
Minutes of the Meeting, ¶ 4.1, WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/172 (July 6, 2018). China elicited the following
response from U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, Dennis Shea: “the United States finds it curious that China
has asked to place this item on the agenda for today’s meeting . . . we are perplexed that China now asserts
its status as a victim . . . [w]e note the attempt by some Members to cast the President’s actions in terms
that suit their desire to pursue a particular WTO recourse. These attempts are without valid foundation
and we will not entertain them.” U.S. Mission Geneva, Ambassador Dennis Shea’s Statement at the WTO
General Council, U.S. MISSION TO INT’L ORG. IN GENEVA (May 8, 2018), https://geneva.usmission.gov/
2018/05/08/ambassador-dennis-sheas-statement-at-the-wto-general-council/.

LESTER-MANAK(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/16/2020 9:08 AM

A PROPOSAL FOR A COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AT THE WTO

275

• To assist the committee in its monitoring function, the Secretariat
shall prepare annually a factual report on the trade impact of national
security measures based on notifications and other reliable
information available to it.
This basic framework is by no means comprehensive, but it touches
upon the key functions that the NS Committee should provide to be most
useful to Members. A few specific aspects of these functions will now be
discussed in greater detail.
A. Notifications & Specific Trade Concerns
In order to assist the committee with its monitoring function, Members
should notify all national security restrictions having an impact on trade to
the Secretariat. The notification should include: the title of the measure and
its text; the government body responsible for developing the measure; a list
of products or services impacted by the measure; the objective and rationale
that led the Member to “consider” it necessary, including the nature of urgent
problems where applicable; references to particular sub-provisions of the
relevant national security provisions; and a contact point.
As things stand now, governments have the ability to impose trade
restrictions for protectionist purposes and later invoke the national security
exceptions during litigation. There are requirements that Members “should
be informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under”
GATT Article XXI and GATS Article XIV,21 but the notification obligation
needs to be stronger. It would be desirable to have all national security trade
restrictions announced at the earliest possible stage, ideally during the
process of internal domestic deliberation, in order to have a proper debate
and discussion. Measures that have actually been imposed should be reported
immediately. Bringing these cases to light early and having WTO Members
think carefully about the proper scope of the exception is of great value.
Notifications should be made available to all Members and catalogued
online as part of a national security measures information management
system, similar to the TBT and SPS information management systems.22 This
will allow Members to search all notifications, the concerns raised in
committee, the relevant enquiry points for other Members, and to make
21. Decision of 30 November 1982, Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, ¶
1, L/5426 (1982); GATT Analytical Index (pre-1995), WTO, Article XXI Security Exceptions, in GATT
ANALYTICAL INDEX (PRE-1995) 606 (1994); WTO, GATS Article XIV bis Security Exceptions (Practice),
in WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX ¶ 2 (Feb. 2019).
22. See generally WTO, Technical Barriers to Trade Information Management System (Jun. 24,
2019), http://tbtims.wto.org/en/ (explaining how the TBS IMS works); WTO, Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Information Management System (Jun. 12, 2019), http://spsims.wto.org/en/ (explaining how the SPS IMS
works).
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available all reports related to the committee’s work. Of course, as certain
aspects of national security measures must, by their very nature, be kept
confidential, guidelines should be developed as to the appropriate detail
provided on these measures to the public. However, this aspect of the
committee should be kept as transparent as possible, along with minutes of
the committee meetings, to allow for maximum participation of all Members,
since not all Members are able to attend every meeting due to the small size
of their delegations. This will give Members the opportunity to raise specific
trade concerns (STCs) based on notifications provided, as well as a system
for submitting their own counternotifications. STCs should also be recorded
in an online database.
Transparency provisions in the TBT and SPS agreements have helped
to facilitate non-judicial settlements through establishing best practices and
also through STCs.23 STCs enhance transparency by allowing Members to
name and shame their peers, so that Members are held accountable for the
measures they take. In committee, a Member that is maintaining a measure
must provide a response to the Member or Members concerned, ensuring
that some dialogue takes place, whether it be in clarifying the rationale for a
measure, or explaining why a measure has not been notified, for instance. It
thus provides a forum for Members to communicate when bilateral
discussions fail. In addition, STCs also facilitate the development of
coalitions so that Members can work cooperatively to push for adjustment,
or to coordinate their approach if the concern develops into a dispute.24
Clear guidelines for the submission of STCs to the committee should
be established, based on existing practices in the TBT and SPS committees.
Mainly, it is important that Members submit STCs in advance of regular
committee meetings so that they may be placed on the meeting agenda and
circulated at least ten days in advance of committee meetings. This provides
the Member maintaining the measure an opportunity to prepare a response
and to organize a private bilateral meeting with the Member concerned to
speak frankly about the measure.25 Advance notice also cools the
temperature of discussions and facilitates technical discussion of matters,
limiting political posturing.

23. Holzer, supra note 10, at 3; Marianna B. Karttunen, Transparency and Dispute Settlements:
Complements or Substitutes? A Study of the Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and
Technical Barriers to Trade 223 (Dec. 12, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute)
(on file with Department of Law, European University Institute).
24. See Manak, supra note 11, at 6–7 (discussing how STCs can, inter alia, facilitate coalition
building and increased cooperation amongst states).
25. These bilaterals generally take place on the sidelines of scheduled committee meetings.
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B. Open Discussion and Closed Technical Group
In addition to the specific work of the committee detailed above, there
is also great benefit in maintaining a forum for the general discussion of
national security matters and trade. Any items related to systemic issues
should be placed on the committee agenda in advance of meetings. Where
discussion would benefit from more extensive treatment, special sessions on
thematic issues should be undertaken within the same week that committee
meetings are held. For example, there could be a session on the expansion of
foreign investment screening for national security reasons. This will allow
for a more detailed and focused discussion and coordination on these specific
topics. Looking at the GATS committees, Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott
have noted how sustained discussions in these committees can “help to build
common conceptual frameworks and shared ideas about the fundamental
objectives and limits of the GATS.”26 This is what WTO Secretariat official
Erik Wijkström describes as building blocks that can help develop best
practices among Members and serve as the basis for more cooperative efforts
to address common challenges.
While this function is prominent in a number of other committees and
would be useful in this case, it does have its limitations. A particular
difficulty in this context is the nature of the measures themselves. Since
measures are being taken for the stated purpose of national security, there
will inevitably be some topics that Members would not want to openly
discuss and have documented in the minutes of the committee meetings.
Therefore, we suggest that a Technical Group also be established to serve as
a forum for off-the-record discussions of sensitive issues, where Members
can engage in a more direct manner. The Technical Group could be
composed of committee delegates and would ideally include officials from
capital, not just delegates from the missions in Geneva, with specific
expertise on the matter at issue (i.e. experts from government agencies). This
would not only keep the discussions technical, but also provide for
opportunities to develop recommendations for the committee, for example,
on information that should be provided or excluded from specific
notifications. Essentially, where open discussion is not practical, Members
should be afforded other options.
This would also act as a temporary escape valve for discussion on a
specific measure that a Member has taken, or is planning to take, which could
not be resolved in the regular meetings of the committee. In effect, the
Technical Group would be the second stage in discussions of a matter before
26. Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 575,
587 (2009).
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ad hoc consultations and the rebalancing process are pursued. It thus
provides an additional buffer for Members before action against the Member
maintaining the measure can be taken, thus serving to prevent the escalation
of actions into trade conflict.
C. Ad Hoc Consultations and the Rebalancing Process
The functions detailed above are important for giving Members an
opportunity and an incentive to explain their national security measures
before other Members take trade actions in response, offering more time
before rebalancing can be applied where measures have been notified. In the
absence of litigation and when the discussions of notified measures do not
generate a resolution in committee (either in regular session or through the
Technical Group), a process of ad hoc consultations for rebalancing should
be made available. Regarding how this rebalancing process would work,
there is something to learn from the existing safeguards process. On paper at
least, the Safeguards Agreement rules provide for a quick rebalancing, either
through compensation or suspension. Under Articles 8.1 and 12.3, when a
Member proposes to apply or extend a safeguard measure, it “shall
endeavour to maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and
other obligations” with those Members “affected by such a measure.” To
achieve this, the Members concerned “may agree on any adequate means of
trade compensation.” If compensation cannot be agreed to, Articles 8.2 and
8.3 govern suspensions of concessions or other obligations by the affected
Members, which can be imposed under certain conditions. Under Article
13.1(e), the Safeguards Committee is to “review, at the request of the
Member taking a safeguard measure, whether proposals to suspend
concessions or other obligations are ‘substantially equivalent,’ and report as
appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods.”
In practice, however, this system has not worked very well.
Compensation is a challenge, in part because of the most-favored nation
(MFN) requirement, which places practical limits on what the imposing
Member can offer. And suspension is not allowed for three years unless
specific conditions are met, which allows Members to impose their safeguard
measures for a term of three years and avoid retaliation. To date, the rules
and Committee functions have not been able to facilitate the safeguards
rebalancing process. Issues surrounding this process are currently being
litigated in the Turkey—Air Conditioners case, DS573.27
27. See Request for Consultations by Thailand, Turkey—Additional Duties on Imports of Air
Conditioning Machines from Thailand, WTO Doc. WT/DS573/1 (Dec. 10, 2018). The Panel has reported
that it “does not expect to issue its final report to the parties before the second half of 2020.”
Communication from the Panel, Turkey—Additional Duties on Imports of Air Conditioning Machines,
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For national security rebalancing to work, it needs to account for the
problems with the safeguards rebalancing process. With regard to
compensation, one improvement in the national security context would be
that the Committee could look across all sectors, as it is not limited to goods.
Thus, if offering additional market access to other goods is too sensitive, as
the least sensitive tariffs have already been lowered, a government might
consider offering up liberalization of services, where only a small amount of
liberalization has occurred so far. Governments might find that there are a
number of areas where services liberalization would help them as well as
their trading partners.
For both compensation and suspension, what is needed is a mechanism
to evaluate competing claims of economic injury, as the two sides are not
likely to agree on the amount of harm. Full-fledged dispute settlement would
be too contentious and time-consuming, but some kind of third-party
intervention may be useful. This is something the safeguards process has
lacked.
The ad hoc consultation process should allow for the following:
• an opportunity for affected parties to express concern about a trade
restriction and indicate the amount of economic harm;
• an opportunity for the opposing party to counter with its own harm
estimates and offers of compensation;
• an expedited mediation/arbitration process when the parties cannot
reach agreement on compensation, in order to determine the amount
of harm (the process could be overseen by the chair of the committee
or some other appointee agreed to by the parties);28 and
• a deadline for the imposing party to offer compensation, after which
retaliation in the designated amount, as determined by consultations,
is authorized.
The committee, perhaps through a special working group, can track and
monitor the outcome of these ad hoc consultations, gathering data,
evaluating the effectiveness, and proposing modifications. Working groups
established for this purpose should be temporary, and only include parties to
the original ad hoc consultation, unless both parties agree otherwise. To
WTO Doc. WT/DS573/14 (Oct. 9, 2019).
28. This mediation/arbitration procedure is not envisioned as a replication of a procedure that was
established by the SPS committee in 2014, which provided the chair of the committee to act as a thirdparty mediator between members on matters of concern, when requested. For the 2014 procedure, see
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Procedures to Encourage and Facilitate the
Resolution of Specific Sanitary or Phytosanitary Issues Among Members in Accordance with Article 12.2,
WTO Doc. G/SPS/61 (Sept. 8, 2014). Instead, Members should establish a procedure for choosing from
a roster of potential third-party mediators or arbitrators, which do not have to be WTO delegates or staff.
For example, former Appellate Body judges could be used.
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ensure some transparency, Members should be obligated to notify when
compensation has been agreed to, or retaliation will be taken to the
committee. The details of compensation should be disclosed, although
Members could decline to do so. Retaliation would have to be made public,
however.
Compensation is the preferred approach to rebalancing. Ideally,
governments that impose tariffs or other restrictions on specific products for
national security purposes would offer to reduce tariffs or restrictions on
other products or services (although if a government is acting in a
protectionist manner, expecting it to liberalize is perhaps unrealistic).
Adding services as a compensation option may be significant. One of the
reasons compensation has not worked as well in recent years in the
safeguards context is that as tariff levels have decreased, it has become
harder for countries invoking safeguards to find alternative products on
which they could give meaningful concessions.29 Adding services to the mix
would open a wide range of compensation possibilities, especially
considering how few services commitments most countries have made and
thus how much potential there is for additional liberalization.
Negotiations over the extent of this compensation will never be easy,
but they can be facilitated through carefully-designed rules. For example,
there could be a requirement that in order to impose an import restriction for
national security reasons, a government must identify three products or
services for which it would consider negotiating compensatory
liberalization. Forcing governments to suggest possible compensation could
give the negotiating process a boost.
That process will come with some significant challenges. It will bump
up against core GATT/WTO principles such as MFN. Liberalizing trade with
only the complainant undermines this principle, while liberalizing trade with
everyone makes the exercise much more challenging.30

29. JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 168 (1994); Chad P. Bown & Meredith A.
Crowley, Safeguards in the World Trade Organization 6 (Feb. 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with Brandeis University), http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/bown_crowley_kluwer.pdf
(“Although compensation for safeguard measures was often negotiated in the 1960s and 1970s, as tariff
rates fell and more products came to be freely traded, as a practical matter, it became difficult for countries
to agree on compensation packages.”). See also Matthew R. Nicely & David T. Hardin, Article 8 of the
WTO Safeguards Agreement: Reforming the Right to Rebalance, 23 J. CIV. RTS. ECON. DEV. 699, 716
(2008) (discussing the impact of tariffs on concessions).
30. Direct payments to the affected foreign producers, like in the U.S.–Cotton Subsidies case may
offer a solution, but they are not always a political possibility, and they are far from ideal as a matter of
policy.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
As governments continue to push forward with bilateral, regional, and
multilateral trade agreements, there will be opportunities to experiment with
new mechanisms. The Trump administration is unlikely to support the
proposals made here (and some other countries are likely to object as well),
but other governments that are concerned about the abuse of national security
measures can incorporate provisions along these lines in agreements that
they sign, both bilateral and plurilateral. In this way, the norm can spread,
with the hope that its usefulness will be demonstrated and with the aim of
eventual inclusion in a multilateral agreement.

